The Palestinian Right of Return: A Call for Legal Solutions and the Prevention of Settler-Colonial Displacement

rasterverkosto

Text by Chloe Kihlman
Image by Alp Duran/Unsplash

The forced mass displacement of millions of Palestinians from Northern Gaza towards the Egyptian border in the south carried out by Israeli military forces since October 7th 2023 has been described by journalists, human rights experts and activists alike as a calculated attempt by Israel to ethnically cleanse* the Palestinian population from Gaza1. Israel is doing so under the guise of fighting Hamas; however, it is not an isolated event, but a part of its continued settler-colonial project that started in the first half of the 20th century—built on the forced displacement of Palestinians. 

A leaked Israeli Intelligence Ministry document dated October 13th 2023 outlines the permanent resettlement of 2,2 million Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt. The plan would commence with Gazans being “evacuated” south, followed by the occupation of the entire Gaza strip. In response to this, Israeli officials insist that the document is “hypothetical” and “not based on military intelligence” and is simply a basis for discussions within the government2. At the time of writing, at least 26 422 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli attacks – nearly 65 per cent of them women and children3. 1.9 million or more than 85 per cent of the Gazan population have been displaced since October 7th, with almost half of Gaza’s population now residing in the city of Rafah close to the Egyptian border4. More recently, it has been reported that Israel held secret talks with countries such as the D.R. Congo about the forceful expulsion of Palestinians outside of Gaza5. This would be a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law on Israel’s part6, but also a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on the part of D.R. Congo or any other State party that aids Israel in their attempt to expel Palestinians7. In particular now, as the International Court of Justice, pending its final decision on the matter of whether Israel has violated its obligations under this very convention, ordered on January 26th 2024, that “(…) Israel must, in accordance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of this Convention (…)”8. In its decision, the Court also recalled that Israel’s military operations in Gaza have resulted in the mass displacement of Palestinians9.

Contrary to its claims otherwise, Israel is doing exactly what it sought out to do: to externally displace the Palestinian population from Gaza.

Palestinian return following mass expulsion: A 76-year-old plight

As the humanitarian situation in Gaza is currently nothing short of catastrophic, some UN officials, such as the commissioner general of The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Philippe Lazzarini, claim that Palestinians may have no other choice but to seek refuge in Egypt if a ceasefire cannot be reached10. Nonetheless, many Palestinians do not see this as an option and would rather suffer or die in Gaza than go to Egypt11. Egypt has also made it clear for a myriad of reasons that it is not planning on taking in Palestinian refugees12. Some wonder, given the dire straits Palestinians find themselves in, why Egypt is not willing to accept them as refugees and why Palestinians are not actively seeking refuge in Egypt. The answer lies in the legal concept of the right of return, which is recognized in multiple international human rights law instruments13.

Many Palestinians currently fear that being forced into Egypt would result in a similar fate shared by many of their ancestors and fellow nationals during the 1948 Nakba and the 1967 Naksa: stateless and unable to return to their homeland of Palestine.

After Britain returned their mandate of Palestine to the UN in 1947, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 181 (II), known as the “Partition Plan”, which allocated circa 45 per cent of Mandate Palestine for the establishment of an independent Arab State (excluding Jerusalem) of circa 1,2 million people. What made the Partition Plan even more controversial, was that the remainder of Mandate Palestine was allocated to the 650 000 Jews and the same number of Palestinian Arabs in the area for the establishment of a “Jewish State”—despite the Jewish population being a clear minority and owning only about six per cent of Palestine’s territory14. Following the Israeli declaration of independence in 1948, the newly formed “state”, through the forceful acquisition of Arab territory and attacks against Palestinian Arabs, ethnically cleansed* approximately 750 000 Palestinian Arabs, and by 1949, Israel held effective control over 78 per cent of all of Palestine—in clear violation of international law, including the Partition Plan15 (15). Later, in 1967, circa 400 000–500 000 Palestinian Arabs were ethnically cleansed* in what is known as Al-Naksa, resulting in the Israeli occupation of the remainder of historic Palestine, including the West Bank and Gaza16. 

After the Nakba, UNGA Resolution 194 (III) was passed, which in its 11th paragraph recognizes a right of return to Palestine for Palestinians refugees17. Not long after, Israel was granted membership to the UN, on the condition that Israel“unreservedly accepts the obligations of the UN Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the UN” —including the obligations set forth inResolution 194 (III)18. Since then, Israel has not complied with the Resolution nor almost a dozen other UN resolutions and human rights provisions establishing, recognizing and/or calling for the right of return (of Palestinians) since 194819. Israel has historically prevented Palestinians from returning to Palestine both factually and legally since the birth of Israel20—with minimal legal accountability or political outcry for this (or any other unlawful acts by Israel, for that matter) by Western states in the international “community”21.

Furthermore, by 1952, Israel passed the Israeli Nationality Law of 1952, repealing the old Palestine Citizenship Order, making Israeli citizenship available to both Jews and Palestinian Arabs from “former” Palestine, however on different legal bases, resulting in only a small part of the population receiving Israeli citizenship after the establishment of Israel22. Palestinians who had been displaced abroad were purposefully excluded from this description and could only receive Israeli citizenship if they were to return to Israel by 1952, but in practice, their return was rarely granted by Israel23. The effect of this was almost a million Palestinians becoming “effectively denationalized en masse”—further hindering their legal return to their homeland24. Meanwhile, according to the very same law, in contrast to Palestinians, Israeli citizenship could be granted to any Jew who immigrated to Israel, regardless of their country of origin as described in the Law of Return of 195025.

Taking refuge in Egypt would undoubtedly result in a similar situation and would fulfill the very goal of Israel, i.e. the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, continuing its settler-colonial project in Palestine. Egypt recognizes this, but finds itself at a crossroads, as do Palestinians: remaining in Gaza constitutes a constant threat to Palestinian lives; however, crossing the border means effectively giving up one’s chances of ever returning home. 

The role of the UNRWA in realizing the Palestinian right of return

The UNRWA was established in December 1949 with the temporary mandate to provide relief for Palestinian refugees in collaboration with local governments “without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) (…)”, i.e. the Palestinian right of return, with the purpose of “(…) continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees (…) to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability (…)”26. The following year, during the drafting process of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Statute, Palestinians were placed in a rights regime of their own in terms of their status as refugees27. The Arab delegates in the Third Committee drafting the UNCHR proposed that it should “(…) not apply to persons who are at present receiving from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance”, these “organs and agencies” understood as the UNRWA28. The argument behind this was that Palestinians should be given a “separate and special status” as they, in contrast to other refugees, were not displaced as a result of fear of persecution, “but as a result of the decision of the UN to partition Palestine in 1947, and because they were prevented from returning to their homes by a Member State of the United Nations (namely Israel)”29. Moreover, the Palestinians “were the ‘direct responsibility of the United Nations’ and ‘could not be placed in the general category of refugees without betrayal of that responsibility’”30. This amendment was agreed upon and was adopted in December 195031. A similar formulation was used in the 1951 Refugee Convention and was also meant to be temporary until the Palestinian refugee crisis had been solved by the UNRWA as was sought out in Resolution 194 (III)32.

As is evident today, the UN has failed to come to a lasting solution where Palestinians would have been able to return to Palestine. What has made this goal and UNRWA’s relief work in general increasingly difficult since its formation, has been both practical and economic. For example, Israel has routinely limited UNRWA’s aid to Gaza since it imposed a complete blockade on Gaza during the second half of 200733. The funding the UNRWA receives is provided on a voluntary basis by UN member states and has historically been affected by the political developments and interests of contributing states34. For example, during the Trump administration, the US ceased their donations to the UNRWA, resulting in an overall deficit of $446 million35. More recently, the US, Australia, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and Finland have temporarily ceased providing financial aid to UNRWA following Israel’s accusations that twelve of the 13 000 UNRWA staff members may have been involved with Hamas on October 7th 202336. Nine of those staff members have now been terminated according to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, however, many countries’ choice to halt funding to the agency has been criticized as collective punishment of Palestinians, since the aid provided by the agency is vital for Palestinians in the Gaza strip as they face not only ongoing Israeli bombardment, but also deprivation of basic needs such as food, water and fuel37. UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, also recently tweeted that states defunding the UNRWA, following the ICJ’s decision on Friday, may be now violating their obligations under the Genocide Convention38.

New rules for the protection against settler-colonialism

“The current absence of the implementation of a collective right of return ought not to be a sign of its limitations, but on the contrary, a sign of its opportunities for standard-setting in international law to protect the rights of expelled groups and to deter states from expelling people in the future.”

Given the cataclysmic violence Israel has subjected the civilians in Gaza to and the ongoing mass displacement of Palestinians, there is an unequivocal need for a legal solution that guarantees not only peace, restitution and a way forward in Israel/Palestine, but especially securing the Palestinian right of return: Palestinians are currently the largest stateless population in the world. Most of them live in refugee camps in neighboring states, and those who live in the Occupied Palestinian Territories or even in Israel live under an apartheid regime39. Palestinians have been displaced for over 75 years exacerbating their plight and strengthening the need to realize their return40. Especially in light of the current war on Gaza, realizing Palestinians’ right of return and resettlement back home will need to be solved, which international law will undoubtedly be tasked with. Legally recognizing a collective right of return of Palestinians on the specific basis of ending their near century-long forceful displacement and preventing continued statelessness would undoubtedly be a major move within international human rights law. The recognition of a right of return of any large group that has been forcibly displaced evokes well-founded questions on the scope of the rules, their feasibility and legitimacy of its drafters—all of which would and should duly be considered. However, feasibility considerations do not and should not diminish the significance of the existence of a collective right of return as a right as a standard. The current absence of the implementation of a collective right of return ought not to be a sign of its limitations, but on the contrary, a sign of its opportunities for standard-setting in international law to protect the rights of expelled groups and to deter states from expelling people in the future41.

International law at a critical juncture

“The international legal framework is only as strong as the actions taken against those who (attempt to) violate its rules.”

The international “community” and international human rights law now finds itself at a crossroads both in terms of its legitimacy and its legacy on the treatment of victims of settler colonialism. Firstly, the UN as an international decision-making body has been, and especially recently in response to Israel’s attacks on Gaza is being, questioned on whether it really is capable of upholding international peace and security. The UN has been unable to realize the Palestinian return home or a solution to the situation overall since 1948, as Western states have repeatedly resisted and/or outright refused to take any meaningful political or legal action against Israel for its actions against Palestinians since its formation, but have rather chosen to remain a political ally of Israel and used the UN’s legal frameworks to block any Member State’s attempt of legal accountability against Israel42.

Secondly, there is also reason to question whether the international “community” is capable or even willing to hold Israel legally accountable given their own imperialist and (settler) colonial histories. For example, the US, an imperial and settler-colonial state itself, has, as a permanent member of the UNSC, blocked at least 34 UNSC draft resolutions related to Palestine/Israel43. Moreover, the UN was the organization that adopted the very Resolution that partitioned Palestine in support of a “Jewish homeland” in Palestine, which eventually led to the Nakba44.

Third, the absence of legal rules that obligates states to take more serious steps, such as widespread economic sanctions, blockades and legal pressure on a state practicing settler colonialism, serves as an open approval for states to continue to forcibly displace parts of their ‘unwanted’ population(s). Similarly, not enforcing already existing rules on States who violate rules they have ratified, such as the recognized right of return, serves as an approval for states to deny the return of those they have forcibly displaced. In other words, the international “community” allowing states to do exactly what they sought out to do—with impunity. The international legal framework is only as strong as the actions taken against those who (attempt to) violate its rules. 

Lastly, all of this is known and felt by Palestinians, which has resulted in a sense of betrayal by the international “community” and with little trust to bring about justice, leaving no other choice than to resist the occupation through whatever means possible—with or without the support of the international “community”.

Following the ICJ’s recent decision on the case of genocide brought against Israel and given Israel’s rejection to it, its plans to continue to “defend itself against Hamas” and its aim of stopping UNRWA operations in Gaza after the war on Gaza, it is evident that Israel is making no effort to realize Palestinians’ right of return45. Time will tell when and how a possible ceasefire will be reached; however, what is clear is that it will not be at the initiative of Israel—unless it receives significant political pressure to do so, its closest allies cease to support them economically or with arms or it suffers economically as a result of its continued war on Gaza.

Until then, pressure from the ongoing and ever-growing worldwide Palestinian solidarity movement and BDS campaign will continue and hopefully, sooner than later, an international criminal tribunal will be established, tasked with investigating and trying Israel for all of its acts against international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law during the past 76 years. Experts in transitional justice will work towards dismantling the current apartheid system and finding a lasting solution for continued life in Palestine for all of its inhabitants.  Finally, a legal framework on the right of return in cases of settler-colonialism will be established—at long last enabling Palestinians to return to their homeland.  

The Palestinian plight serves as an example that settler colonialism and forced displacements are not phenomena of the past but are still very much a part of our present. It is now up to international law to effectively prevent it from becoming one of the future.

* Note that the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not a legal term. However, it is used in other contexts to describe the act of forced displacement, systematic killings, forced disappearances, rape, persecution and similar acts of a group of people on the basis of ethnicity.

About the author

Chloe Kihlman (LL.B.) is a research assistant at the Institute for Human Rights at Åbo Akademi University and is a graduate of European and international law of Maastricht University. Her research interests include state violence, statelessness and the use and regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems and artificial intelligence in armed conflicts. 

Endnotes

  1. France24 ‘UN agency chief says Israel is trying to force Gazans into Egypt’ France24 (Washington, 12 October 2023) <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231210-un-agency-chief-says-israel-trying-to-force-gazans-into-egypt> ; Helm S, ‘Netanyahu told 1.1 million Palestinians they had 24 hours to evacuate. What is that if not ethnic cleansing?’ The Guardian (14 October 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/14/benjamin-netanyahu-palestinians-evacuate-ethnic-cleansing> ↩︎
  2. Teibel A, ‘An Israeli ministry, in a ‘concept paper’, proposes transferring Gaza to Egypt’s Sinai’ AP News (31 October 2023) <https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-population-transfer-hamas-egypt-palestinians-refugees-5f99378c0af6aca183a90c631fa4da5a> ; Adler J, ‘South into the Sinai: Will Israel Force Palestinians Out of Gaza?’ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 October 2023) <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90869> ; Abraham Y, ‘Expel all Palestinians from Gaza, recommends Israeli gov’t ministry’ +972 Magazine (30 October 2023) <https://www.972mag.com/intelligence-ministry-gaza-population-transfer/>  ↩︎
  3. AJLabs ‘Israel-Gaza war in maps and charts: Live tracker’ Al Jazeera (28 January 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker> ↩︎
  4. Motamedi M and Adler N, ‘Israel’s war on Gaza live: Israeli assault continues on 100th day of war’ Al Jazeera (14 January 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/1/14/israels-war-on-gaza-live-100-days-of-war-in-gaza-as-more-children-killed> ↩︎
  5. The New Arab ‘Israel ‘plans to expel Gaza population’ to Democratic Republic of Congo’ The New Arab (03 January 2024) <https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-plans-expel-gaza-population-congo>  ↩︎
  6. Rule 129 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005, Volume I; Article 17 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 ↩︎
  7. Article III (e) UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277; United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies data Base: D.R Congo’s ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en&_gl=1*fksegt*_ga*MTEwNTA0NjYxMi4xNzAxODYwMDA5*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTcwNTIzODk5OC4xMS4wLjE3MDUyMzkwMDEuMC4wLjA.> ↩︎
  8. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 26 January 2024, para 78 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf ↩︎
  9. Ibid, para 70. ↩︎
  10. Lazzarini P, ‘Opinion: We must prevent humanitarian aid from being used as an instrument of war’ Los Angeles Times (9 December 2023) <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-12-09/israel-gaza-hamas-united-nations-humanitarian-relief> ↩︎
  11. Helm S, ‘Netanyahu told 1.1 million Palestinians they had 24 hours to evacuate. What is that if not ethnic cleansing?’ The Guardian (14 October 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/14/benjamin-netanyahu-palestinians-evacuate-ethnic-cleansing> ↩︎
  12. El Aasar, N, ‘The Questions for Egypt’ Protean Magazine (29 October 2023) <https://proteanmag.com/2023/10/29/the-questions-for-egypt/> ↩︎
  13. Arts. 4, 6 (4) & 158 (3) IV Geneva Convention; Art. 14 (2) Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States; 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; Art. 13 (2) UDHR, Art. 12 (4) ICCPR, Art. 5 (d) (11) ICERD, Art. 3 (2) Protocol 4 to the ECHR, Art. 2 (5) ACHR & Art. 12 (2) ACHPR ↩︎
  14. Albanese FP and Takkenberg L, Palestinian Refugees in International Law (Oxford University Press, Incorporated 2020) 27-28; Winder A, ‘UN Partition Plan, 1947: Paving the Way to the Impending Nakba’, Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question (2023) <https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/159/un-partition-plan-1947>; Kihlman C, ‘Imagining a Collective Right of Return: A Study of Legal Grounds for the Case of Palestinian Refugees’ (Bachelor of Laws thesis, Maastricht University Faculty of Law 2023) 5-6 ↩︎
  15. Lawand K, ‘The Right to Return of Palestinians in International Law’ (1996) 8 International Journal of Refugee Law 532, 536; Beauchamp Z, ‘What is the Nakba’ Vox (14 May 2018) <https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080030/israel-palestine-nakba>; Charif M, The Nakba: Stages of a Forced Displacement’, Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question (2023)  <https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/160/nakba>; Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 29-36; Haddad M, ‘Mapping Israeli occupation’ Al Jazeera (19 May 2021) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/18/mapping-israeli-occupation-gaza-palestine>; Al Jazeera, ‘The Nakba did not start or end in 1948’ Al Jazeera (23 May 2017) <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/23/the-nakba-did-not-start-or-end-in-1948> ↩︎
  16. Lawand (n 14) 536-537; Masalha N, ‘The Historical Roots of the Palestinian Refugee Question’, in Naseer Aruri (ed), Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return (Pluto Press 2001) 61-62; Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 49-52; Kihlman (n 13) 6. ↩︎
  17. UNGA Res 194 (III) (11 December 1948) A/RES/194 ↩︎
  18. UNGA Res 273 (III) (11 May 1949) A/Res/273 (III) ↩︎
  19. Art. 13 (2) UDHR; Art. 12 (4) ICCPR; United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies database: Israeli ratification of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CCPR&Lang=en> ; UNGA Resolutions 194 (III), 3236, 31/20 & 32/40; UNSC Resolutions 237, 468, 694 & 799 ↩︎
  20. Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 36-38. ; Sections 1 (3) & 2-5 Israel: The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law 5714-1954 ↩︎
  21. Asrar S & Hussein M, ‘How the US has used its veto power at the UN in support of Israel’ Al Jazeera (26 October 2023) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/26/how-the-us-has-used-its-veto-power-at-the-un-in-support-of-israel>; Madanoglu OF, ‘Nobody has ever held Israel accountable for its repeated violations of international, humanitarian laws’ Anadolu English (19 October 2023) <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/-nobody-has-ever-held-israel-accountable-for-its-repeated-violations-of-international-humanitarian-laws-/3026518>; Lack of Accountability Encourages Israel to Commit More Crimes Against the Palestinian People – Statement Submitted to the Human Rights Council by Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (A/HRC/51/NGO/200) <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/lack-of-accountability-encourages-israel-to-commit-more-crimes-against-the-palestinian-people-statement-submitted-to-the-human-rights-council-by-palestinian-centre-for-human-rights-a-hrc-51/> ↩︎
  22.  Sections 3 & 18 (a) Israel: Nationality Law 5712-1952; Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 38 & 156-158. ↩︎
  23. Bracka JM, ‘Past the Point of No Return – The Palestinian Right of Return in International Human Rights Law’ (Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2005) 272, 285 citing Tanya Kramer, ‘The Controversy of a Palestinian “Right of Return” to Israel’ (2001) 18 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 979, 998. ↩︎
  24. Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 158. ↩︎
  25.  Section 2 Israel: Nationality Law 5712-1952 ↩︎
  26.  UNGA Res 302(8 December 1949) A/RES/302 paras 5 & 7 ↩︎
  27. Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 78-79. ↩︎
  28.  Statement of the representative of Lebanon GAOR, 5th sess., 3rd comm., 328th mtg., para. 47 (27 November 1950) ↩︎
  29. Albanese & Takkenberg (n 13) 80. ↩︎
  30. Ibid; Statement of the representative of Lebanon GAOR, 5th sess., 3rd comm., 328th mtg., para. 47 (27 November 1950) ↩︎
  31. UNGA, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 December 1950, UN doc. A/RES/428(V, para 7 (c) ↩︎
  32.  Article 1D 1951 Refugee Convention ↩︎
  33. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Gaza Strip – The humanitarian impact of 15 years of the blockade – June 2022 (30 June 2022) <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022> ↩︎
  34. UNRWA: How We Are Funded <https://www.unrwa.org/how-you-can-help/how-we-are-funded>   ↩︎
  35. Statement of UNRWA Commissioner-General to the Virtual Advisory Commission (1 July 2020) <https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-virtual-advisory-commission>; UN, ‘UNRWA Faces Greatest Financial Crisis in Its History Following 2018 Funding Cuts, Commissioner-General Tells Fourth Committee – Press Release (9 November 2018) <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-faces-greatest-financial-crisis-in-its-history-following-2018-funding-cuts-commissioner%E2%80%91general-tells-fourth-committee-press-release/>; France24 ‘UN agency eyes $1.2 bn budget for Palestinians despite US cuts’ France24 (29 January 2019) <https://www.france24.com/en/20190129-un-agency-eyes-12-bn-budget-palestinians-despite-us-cuts> ↩︎
  36. Yle News, ‘Finland suspends funding for UN agency serving Palestinians’ Yle News (27 January 2024) <https://yle.fi/a/74-20071680>; Al Jazeera, ‘Palestinians condemn suspension of UNRWA funding by Western nations’ Al Jazeera (27 January 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/27/palestinians-slam-suspension-of-unrwa-funding-by-some-western-nations> ↩︎
  37. Al Jazeera, ‘UNRWA fund cuts by the West ‘collective punishment’ against Palestinians’ Al Jazeera (28 January 2024)  <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/unrwa-fund-cuts-by-the-west-collective-punishment-against-palestinians>   ↩︎
  38.  Taussi S, ‘YK :n asiantuntija: UNRWA:n avun keskeyttäjät saattavat rikkoa tuomioistuimen kansanmurhapäätöstä’ Yle News <https://yle.fi/a/74-20071709>  Tweet from Francesca Albanese via X (28 January 2024) <https://twitter.com/FranceskAlbs/status/1751554749659324847> ↩︎
  39. UNRWA: Palestine Refugees <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>; Amnesty International, ‘Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity’ (2022) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/>; Human Rights Watch, ‘A Threshold Crossed’ (27 April 2021) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution> ↩︎
  40. Citino N, Martín Gil A and P. Norman K, ‘Generations of Palestinian Refugees Face Protracted Displacement and Dispossession’ (Migration Policy Institute, 3 May 2023) <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/palestinian-refugees-dispossession> ↩︎
  41. Kihlman C, ‘Imagining a Collective Right of Return: A Study of Legal Grounds for the Case of Palestinian Refugees’ (Bachelor of Laws thesis, Maastricht University Faculty of Law 2023) 26-27. ↩︎
  42. Asrar S & Hussein M (n 20); Madanoglu OF (n 20); EuromedRights, ‘EU and accountability: A History of selective bargain’ (30 June 2022) <https://euromedrights.org/publication/eu-and-accountability-a-history-of-a-selective-bargain/> ↩︎
  43. Asrar S & Hussein M (n 20) ↩︎
  44. UNGA Res 181 (II) (29 November 1947) A/RES/181 ↩︎
  45. Al Jazeera English, ‘Benjamin Netanyahu reaction on ICJ ruling Al Jazeera English (27 January 2024) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dx_6KE_7gkY>; CBS Mornings, ‘Israel says it will stop UNRWA from operating in Gaza after war’ CBS Mornings (28 January 2024) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwNzbBJW2gU>   ↩︎

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